Research focuses

Personnel Economics, Labor Economics, Organization Theory

Curriculum vitae

• Since 2009 University Professor at the Department of Economics of University of Cologne
• 2003 - 2009 Research Assistant at the Chair “Business Administration II” at University of Bonn
• 2006 - 2009 Habilitation at University of Bonn
• 2003 - 2006 Doctoral studies at University of Bonn
• 1998 - 2003 Studies of Economics at University of Bonn

• Strategic Shirking: A Theoretical Analysis of Multitasking and Specialization. International Economic Review 57 (2016), pp. 507-532 (with Jed DeVaro)
• The Optimality of Heterogeneous Tournaments. Journal of Labor Economics 33 (2015), pp. 1007-1042 (with Marc Gürtler)
• Sabotage in Contests: A Survey. Public Choice 164 (2015), pp. 135-155 (with Subhasish Modak Chowdhury)
• Information Policy in Tournaments with Sabotage. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 115 (2013), pp. 932-966 (with Johannes Münster and Petra Nieken)
• Optimal Contracts for Lenient Supervisors. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 81 (2012), pp. 403-420 (with Thomas Giebe)
• Feedback in Tournaments under Commitment Problems: Experimental Evidence. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 19 (2010), pp. 771-810 (with Christine Harbring)
• Optimal tournament contracts for heterogeneous workers. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 75 (2010), pp. 180-191 (with Matthias Kräkel)
• Double-Sided Moral Hazard, Efficiency Wages and Litigation. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 26 (2010), pp. 337-364 (with Matthias Kräkel)
• Sabotage in Dynamic Tournaments. Journal of Mathematical Economics 46 (2010), pp. 179-190 (with Johannes Münster)
• On Sabotage in Collective Tournaments. Journal of Mathematical Economics 44 (2008), pp. 383-393